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Survey of National Legislation
Regulating Insider frading
Mary J. Houle*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years much attention has been focused on the phenomenon of "in-
sider trading." The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
now appears to have wide-spread public support for its hard-line approach toward
insider trading practices. Previously hostile to a broad prohibition of insider
trading, even the Supreme Court has lent a sympathetic ear to the pleas of the
SEC in the recent Carpenter case, which hinted at support for the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading. ' The prevailing attitude is that confidence in the fair
operation of the securities markets must not be undermined by insiders who
deprive those trading "fairly" from earning a profit; insiders must not be allowed
to appropriate information in order to gain unjust enrichment.
The U.S. securities exchanges are increasingly affected by foreign investors
who trade on the U.S. exchange markets. The SEC considers cooperation by
foreign governments and individuals vital to the successful implementation of
U.S. insider trading regulations. In part as a response to pressure from the U.S.
government, many governments around the world have enacted or are now con-
sidering new insider trading legislation.
I. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Governing Statute
Since May of 1987 the Council of the European Community has been consider-
ing a proposed directive concerning the regulation of insider trading.' The
* Member of the class of 1989, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
2. Proposition de directive du Conseil conqernant la coordination des r~glementations relatives aux
operations d'initi~s, COM(87) 111 final, J. 0. Comm. Eur. 87/C 153/09.
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Council recently submitted it to the European Parliament and to the Economic
and Social Committee for comment. The proposal will in all likelihood be
discussed by the Council in the latter half of 1988.
The Council's proposal stresses the importance of securities markets and the
value of investor confidence in securities exchanges. It notes that this confidence
depends on placing all investors on an equal footing. Since many European
countries do not yet prohibit insider trading, and since considerable differences
exist among those which do prohibit it, the proposed directive calls for coordi-
nated regulation of such practices. Cooperation would 'facilitate regulation by
combining powers of authorities in the different countries to prevent insider
trading across national boundaries.
B. Definition of Insiders
Article I of the proposal directs all European Community members to prohibit
persons, who in the exercise of their profession or functions obtain knowledge
concerning privileged information, from utilizing confidential knowledge which
concerns securities bought and sold on public stock exchanges.
Member states will be instructed to impose the prohibition contained in article
I on all persons who have obtained privileged information (tippees) from one
who acquired that information in the exercise of their profession or function.
C. Regulated Information
Privileged information includes information which is not publicly known con-
cerning one or many securities of publicly traded corporations which, if made
public, would be capable of influencing the trading of those securities on the
market.
Those issuers of securities, admitted on the official stock lists of one or more
member states or which are negotiated on another stock exchange must inform
the public of the involved member states, without delay, of all decisions capable
of influencing the trading course of those securities. There may be legitimate
reasons for not disclosing privileged information. In order to avoid the obligation
of disclosure in such cases, the competent authorities must be informed of the
information and of the need to maintain confidentiality.
D. Regulated Transactions
The prohibition does not apply to securities bought or sold outside of the
securities exchange if a professional intermediary has not intervened. These
securities include not only those normally negotiated on public exchanges, but
also negotiable options.
Those who have access to privileged information are forbidden from:
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1. comunicating that privileged information to a third party if it is not communi-
cated in the exercise of their profession or function; and
2. recommending to a third party, on the basis of that privileged information, to
buy or sell securities negotiated on their public exchange.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
The proposed directive includes no sanctions, although the European Commu-
nity might establish guidelines for sanctions at some future time. As now drafted,
the proposal will allow the individual member states to determine their own civil
and/or criminal sanctions under their national laws.
F. Conclusion
The proposed directive may or may not be adopted in the foreseeable future.
While the proposal itself carries no authoritative weight, it does indicate that
member states are concerned with insider trading.
The directive recognizes that many states have secrecy laws, especially in
banking regulations. Nonetheless the authorities should be notified of confiden-
tial, price sensitive information. The authorities may use such knowledge only in
their specific administrative or jurisdictional procedures, thus maintaining the
integrity of the secrecy laws.
II. GREAT BRITAIN
A. Governing Statute
The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 serves as the primary
statute regulating insider trading.
The Financial Services Act 1986 also regulates insider dealing in Part VII by
modifying parts of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
B. Definition of Insiders
Section 1 of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 defines insid-
ers as all individuals who are, or at any time in the preceding six months have
been, knowingly connected with a corporation, or one related to it.
Under section 1(3), tippees who knowingly obtain information, either directly
or indirectly, from an insider are prohibited from dealing on a recognized stock
exchange in securities of that company if they know that the information is
unpublished price sensitive information relating to those securities. Tippees are
prohibited from trading in securities of other corporations if they know the
information is unpublished price sensitive information and that it relates to any
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factual or contemplated transaction involving the first company and the other
company, or involving one of them and the securities of the other, or to the fact
that any such transaction is no longer contemplated. This section is specifically
aimed at tender offers and take-overs. Scienter is an essential element for all
insider liability.
Crown servants are prohibited from using or transmitting inside information
for gaining a profit or avoiding a loss. The Financial Services Act 1986, section
173 extended liability to public servants as well. Public servants include, among
others, members or servants of any authority or transferee body, members of self-
regulating organizations or recognized investment exchanges or recognized clear-
ing houses. Section 173(5), also provides that the Secretary of State may by order
declare any member, officer, employee, or individual connected with any group
who appears to exercise a public function to be a public servant if he has access to
unpublished price sensitive information relating to securities.
C. Regulated Information
Section I prohibits insiders from dealing on a recognized stock exchange in
securities of a company if they have information which:
I. is held by virtue of being connected with the corporation;
2. if it would be reasonable to expect these persons not to disclose that informa-
tion except for the proper performance of their functions attaching to that
position; and
3. if they know it is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those
securities.
Section 2 forbids individuals, who are or have been at any time in the preceed-
ing six months, knowingly connected with a corporation from dealing in se-
curities of any other company if they obtain information by the following means:
1. information held by virtue of their connection with the first company;
2. if it would be reasonable to expect them not to disclose that information
unless in the proper performance of their functions;
3. if they know the information is unpublished price sensitiveinformation in
relation to those securities of that other corporation; and
4. if it relates to any actual or contemplated transaction involving the two
corporations.
Section 10 defines "unpublished price sensitive information" in relation to any
securities of a company as information which directly or indirectly relates to
specific matters of concern to that company and is "not generally known to those
persons who are accustomed or would be likely to deal in those securities, but
which would if it were generally known to them be likely materially to affect the
price of those securities."
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D. Regulated Transactions
Individuals to whom the sections apply are prohibited from dealing, counsell-
ing others to deal, and communicating the information to any other person.
Individuals are not prohibited from:
1. doing any particular thing other than with a view to making a profit or avoiding a
loss for himself or a third party by the use of that information;
2. entering into a transaction in the course of the exercise of good faith of one's
functions as a liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy; or
3. doing any particular thing if the information
a. was obtained by him in the course of a business of a jobber (individual,
partnership, or company dealing in securities on a recognized stock ex-
change) in which he was engaged or employed,
b. was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him to obtain in
the ordinary course of that business, and
c. he does that thing in good faith in the course of that business.
Section 5 states that those prohibited under sections I and 2 are forbidden from
counseling or procuring any other person to deal in those securities if the tipper
has knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the tippee would deal in the
securities outside Great Britain on any stock exchange other than a registered
stock exchange. These persons are further prohibited from communicating that
insider information to any other person if they know or have reasonable cause to
believe that that person or another party would take advantage of the information
in order to deal, or to counsel or procure any other party to deal, in the securities
outside Great Britain on any stock exchange other than a registered stock
exchange.
Dealing in international bonds and debentures, however, are excluded under
section 6 from the prohibitions described above if certain conditions are satisfied.
They must be:
1. dealt with in good faith; and
2. the party must be an issue manager for that issue or an officer, employee or
agent of an issue manager for that issue; or
3. the party is or was an issue manager for an international bond issue who is
making a market in that debenture or right; or
4. the party is an officer, employee or agent of such an issue manager and deals
in good faith as one making a market in that debenture or of right as an
officer, employee or agent of such a person.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
No civil penalties are provided for a violation of this statute.
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2. Criminal
Those who contravene the rules are liable under section 8(a) upon conviction
on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or a fine, or
both, and under (b) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both.
The Secretary of State institutes all proceedings or the Director of Public
Prosecutions gives his consent.
III. IRELAND
A. Governing Statute
The Irish Government passed an Explanatory and Financial Memorandum,
Companies (No.2) Bill 1987, in order to strengthen some of the existing provi-
sions of the Companies Act, 1963. The applicable provisions are located in Part
V of the Bill, including sections 90 through 93. The bill introduces some new
measures which aim to "eliminate, deter or penalize certain abuses and malprac-
tices which can occur in the management and direction of companies." Through
this bill the government aims to "create a climate of confidence for business
activity in which genuine commercial endeavour will prosper and the prospects
for economic development in general will be enhanced." The basic act remains
the Companies Act 1963, which consolidated previous companies legislation.
Ireland also incorporated the Fourth EEC Company Law Directive into their laws
in 1986. Part V of the Act concerns Insider Dealing. Section 90 provides defini-
tions which apply only to securities of lublic limited companies.
B. Definition of Insiders
Section 91 makes it unlawful for one connected with a company to deal in its
securities "if he has any inside information related to it." Such persons are also
prohibited from dealing in securities of any other company if they possess inside
information related to their employment in the first company. In addition, one
who receives inside information (a tippee) is precluded from dealing. The law
likewise prohibits tipping on the basis of inside information.
C. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
Section 92 provides civil punishments for insider trading. One who engages in
insider dealing will be held liable to compensate any other party to the transac-
tion who did not possess the relevant information. That person may be liable to
account to the company that issued the securities for any profit on the transaction.
Section 93 contains limited exceptions to the general rules.
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2. Criminal
No criminal penalties are provided for violations of the statute.
D. Conclusion
In Ireland, recent prosposals have been made to move the job of appointing
inspectors from the Minister to the High Court and to authorize the Minister to
obtain information directly from companies instead of having to conduct a formal
investigation. Proposals have also been suggested that would require directors to
disclose their financial interests in companies.
IV. FRANCE
A. Governing Statute
The French Government regulates insider trading through the Ordonnance of
September 28, 1967, no 67-833 of the Code on Corporations (Code des Socidtds),
as amended through the present date. This ordonnance provides for the creation
of the Commission des Op6rations de Bourse (COB). It sets forth requirements
for public disclosure of pertinent information regarding the status and activities
of corporations, as well as prohibits certain types of insider trading. Article 10-1
(L. no 83-1 of January 3, 1983) regulates insider trading, and article 10-2 (L. no
85-1321 of December 14, 1985) provides for the application of the criminal
punishments set forth under article 405 of the Penal Code to tippers and ex-
ploiters of privileged inside information.
Presently both the Sdnat and the Assembl6e Nationale have passed different
bills which aim at reforming the stock exchange rules. 3 These deal only indirectly
with insider trading. A compromise bill will likely be proposed in the near
future. These bills would add stiffer penalties to insider trading violations. 4
B. Definition of Insiders
Article 162-1 of the law of 1966 and 1983 provides a definition of insiders to be
regulated under the provisons (les initigs de plein droit).) Two categories of
insiders are regulated by French laws: primary insiders who due to their high
position in the corporate structure regularly have access to confidential informa-
tion regarding the corporation; and secondary insiders who obtain information by
means of their occupation.5 Those included in the first category are the chief
3. Sdnat no 130 (1987-1988); Assemblde Nationale No 1002 (1987-1988).
4. See Coignard, La ddontologie, une valeur en hausse A la Bourse de Paris, LA NATION, Apr. 30,
1987.
5. See Ducouloux-Favard, Delit d'initid, 5 JURISCLASSEUR 1 (1987) (Fascicule 112-4-D).
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executive officer, general directors, administrators, members of management, as
well as permanent representatives of legal persons (such as partnerships or corpo-
rations). Immediate family members of directors and officers of a corporation are
deemed "insiders" under French law.
With regard to these primary insiders there is a presumption that they knew the
information was privileged and that they intended to wrongfully profit by it. This
presumption is set forth by article 162-1 of the Code of Corporations. All those
who have profited, directly or indirectly, by trading on the stock exchange are
presumed to have done so through their position as an insider.
Those who obtain privileged information as a result of their profession or
positions are also considered to be insiders subject to the regulations. Courts have
given an extreme interpretation to this category. For example, liquidators and
provisional administrators (.trib.; gr. inst. Paris 30 mars 1979), employees of the
corporation and its subsidiaries (trib.; gr. inst. Paris 18 avril 1979), stockbrokers
or bank employees (trib. gr. inst. Bordeaux 25 mars 1981), journalists (trib gr.
inst. Paris 12 mai 1976), among many others have been held to be subject to the
French insider trading restrictions. 6
In addition to bankers and stockbrokers, all managing personnel of stock
companies must abstain from trading their company's securities on the exchange
as long as material information has not been publicly disclosed. This includes
those who obtain privileged information through other legal means, even through
an ordinary contract. 7
Tippees are not directly regulated, but those who directly or indirectly propose
that others trade on the exchange on the basis of privileged information will be
held responsible for their recommendation. Tippers may be prosecuted under
article 405 of the Penal Code.
The corporation will not be held liable for its transactions, but those who
directed the transaction, or the directors of the corporation, will be held person-
ally liable for the resulting damages.
C. Regulated Information
The old 1970 definition of privileged insider information under article 10-1 was
limited to specific types of information. It stipulated that the information must be
privileged, specific, and relate to technical, commercial, or financial aspects of
the corporation's status or activity.' Under present legislation, "privileged infor-
mation" includes information of a sufficiently precise, particular, and certain
character concerning the securities or business of a corporation which could
6. Ducouloux-Favard, Les initi6s: leurs obligations A l'gard du march6 boursier, LES PETITES
AFFICHES, No. 112, Sept. 17, 1986, at 5, 7.
7. La grande peur des initi~s, LE REVENU FRAN(TAIS, July 1987, at 15.
8. Robert & Viandier, La Surveillance des placements et des marches (L. no 83-1, 3 Jan. 1983, art.
33 A 41), ETUDES ET COMMENTAIRES, at 74.
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reasonably be expected to influence the value of the securities on an exchange. 9
Thus, under the expanded definition, privileged information is no longer limited
to technical, commercial, or financial aspects of the corporation's business.
D. Regulated Transactions
Transactions taking place privately, outside the stock exchange, are not pro-
tected by the legislation. Only those transactions which occur on a stock
exchange are covered by the law.
The legislation imposes on insiders an obligation to abstain from directly or
indirectly (through a third party) trading in securities of corporations about which
they possess privileged information until that information is revealed to the
public.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Prevention
The COB was created by article 1 (L. no 85-695 du 11 juill. 1985) of Odon-
nance no 67-833 du 28 septembre 1967. The COB is empowered to monitor and
investigate transactions occurring on the French stock exchanges, and to control
the public disclosure of corporate information.
The COB possesses no explicit authority, however, to investigate transactions
executed through foreign banks or finance companies located in other countries. 0
Yet article 33 of Law 83-1 of 1983 permits the COB to exchange information with
foreign authorities in a "spirit of international development and cooperation" in
order to suppress transactions effected by means of foreign banks. Article 34
submits to the Commission's jurisdiction all securities issuers besides the state."
2. Civil
The only remedy available to private citizens injured by insider trading is the
action civile which may be initiated in the criminal courts and would be consid-
ered at the same time as the public criminal action. Other civil actions must
satisfy the Court of Cassation's requirements. The requirements are so strict that
only one case has been successfully instituted. 2
Administrators or executives of a corporation are personally liable to anyone
9. For comments on article 10-1 of the ordinance of Sept. 28, 1967, March 30, 1977 Paris, J. C. P.
1978.II.18789 obs. Tunc. see Memento Pratique Francis Lefebvre, Socn"TgS COMMERCIALES, at
717-18 (1987-1988).
10. Commission des Oprations de Bourse, 9 m' Rapport au President 1976, at 90.
11. Ducouloux-Favard, supra note 6, at 5.
12. Saint-Guilhem, 1976 J.C.P. 11. No. 18496 (note A. Tunc.)(Ist case)(Trib. gr. inst. Paris, May
12, 1976). See 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 7-41 (H.
Bloomenthal ed. 1987).
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who is able to demonstrate a loss resulting from the violation. This includes the
corporation itself, the stockholders, and third parties. For statutory support, see
articles 244, 245, and 249 of the 1966 Act which impose liability for all vio-
lations of the provisions applicable to stock companies.
Some out-of-court settlements have been reached by which insiders disgorge
their profits and compensate the corporation or the stockholder who have been
injured by the prohibited transaction. 3
3. Criminal
The public prosecutor prosecutes all claims under these provisions. The Com-
mission has increased its investigations from thirty-three in 1985 to sixty-nine in
1986.14
No fraudulent or speculative intent need exist in order for an insider to be held
liable under the insider trading legislation. Conviction under these laws results in
a period of imprisonment from two months to a maximum of two years. A fine
may be substituted or added. Fees, under article 10-1 (L. no 83-1 du 3 janv. 1983),
will range from six thousand francs to a maximum fine of five million francs or
four times the profit gained by the transaction, whichever is higher.
Currently, under French insider trading laws only individuals may be pros-
ecuted. Thus, criminal sanctions fail to deter insider trading done on behalf of a
corporate shareholder. 11
V. WEST GERMANY
A. Governing Statute
Insider trading regulations in West Germany are part of a special commercial
code encompassing those who engage in transactions on the exchange (Ka-
ufleute). This code is part of federal law and serves as a special code for admis-
sion to the stock exchange. The insider regulations are not part of federal law,
although they are incorporated in the code. These regulations are guidelines
which operate only on the private contractual level between insiders and the
corporations by which they are employed.
A committee of experts formulated the West German regulations in 1970. All
parties which would be affected by the regulations participated in the drafting of
these guidelines. These experts were for the most part members of a Working
Committee of the German Stock Exchange and worked in cooperation with the
"top union" of the German economy (Spitzenverfdnde der deutschen
13. Commission des Operations de Bourse, 8 mc Rapport au Pr6sident 1975, at 97 et seq. See also
9 mc Rapport au Pr6sident 1976, supra note 10, at 91.
14. Commission des Operations de Bourse, 191-" Rapport au Pr6sident 1986, at 90.
15. Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 7-37.
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Wirtschaft)-made up of members of management from the major corporations.
Representatives from the Ministry of State, of the stock exchange, and the banks
also attended the formulation meetings.
The rules set forth apply only to limited liability corporations which have
voluntarily subjected themselves to the regulations. Corporations are expected to
incorporate the regulations into their management and employee structure. In
business practice, the guidelines are usually a part of the employment contract. 6
The complete text of the German insider guidelines including the official annota-
tions can be found in Baumbach-Duden-Hopt, Handelsgesetzbuch, 27. Auflage,
Miinchen 1987. This commentary on the German commercial law includes the
so-called Nebengesetze, with the insider trading sections (16) Insiderhandels-
Richtlinien and (17) Handler- und Beraterregeln.
B. DEFINITION OF INSIDERS
Insiders are legal representatives and members of boards of directors of corpo-
rations or adjoined corporations (such as subsidiaries or parent corporations).
Under section 2 of the regulations insiders include directors, those in manage-
ment and employees who have access to certain types of confidential information
such as changes in earnings, expected dividend rates, merger offers, and take-
over bids. There are no general criteria for employees who will be considered
insiders. Every corporation is permitted to set its own specifications. The primary
factor in determining insider status, however, is the proximity of the person to the
sources of insider information.
In addition to corporate employees, German stockholders who own more than
twenty-five percent of the shares of a corporation are viewed as having insider
status. Directors and employees of banks and financial institutions are also con-
sidered insiders as far as they have access to inside information such as changes
in dividend amounts, liquidation of stock, or other similar developments.
If an insider obtains information from a source not involving his or her em-
ployment or special access to confidential information, then that person is not
forbidden to trade in those securities on the market. Likewise, tippees are not
regulated by the guidelines.
C. Regulated Information
Inside information is defined under paragraph 3 of section 2 as knowledge
which is not generally (publicly) known which may influence the course of trade
of insider securities or "papers" (Insiderpapiere).
16. See (16) Richtlinien fir Insider-Geschafte in borsennotierten oder offentlich angebotenen
Aktien (Einleitung, 1 5, Insiderhandels-Ri), vom 1. Juli 1976, Baumbach/Duden/Hopt, Hand-
elsgesetzbuch, 27 Aufl.(1987); see generally Pfister, Stand der Insiderdiskussion, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 381 (1981).
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Insider securities are defined under Insiderhandels-Ri 2, paragraph 2, as cor-
porate securities (Aktien), bonus or dividend shares or rights (Genussrechte),
convertible deventures or bonds (Wandelverschreibungen), participating (in-
come) debentures or reorganization bonds (Gewinnschuldverschreibungen), op-
tions (Optionsscheine) and subscription privileges (Bezugsrechte).
D. Regulated Transactions
The regulations apply only to trading which occurs on West German stock
exchanges. Paragraph 2 of section 3 states that insiders are prohibited from using
insider information in order to gain a profit for themselves or to give an advantage
to third parties.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Procedure
Inquiries are initiated by complaint. An inquiry board is selected by the listing
committee of the corresponding stock exchange. The board consists of a judge
and four members chosen from the industry sector. This inquiry board reports its
unpublished findings to the corporation involved and to the Federal Minister of
the National Economy.
A committee has been organized to investigate potential violations of insider
trading guidelines. This committee possesses special investigatory powers which
include the ability to force any insider under investigation to submit all informa-
tion he has regarding transactions made by him during the stated time period. He
must specify the names of banks who administrated their insider securities during
the stated time period. In signing the contract with the corporation which in-
cluded insider trading guidelines, the insider impliedly authorized the banks
dealing in that corporation's securities to divulge information which otherwise
would be protected under secrecy laws. Should the insider refuse to permit the
bank to disclose relevant information, the committee may sue the insider and
force him to permit the disclosure.
The review panel determines whether the insider has violated the insider
trading guidelines. It establishes the facts of the transaction as an assessor in the
arbitration between the corporation and the insider. If the panel concludes that the
insider breached the trading regulation, it informs the corporation or credit bank,
and the appropriate ministry. 1 7
2. Civil
Section 3 of paragraph 4 and section 5 set forth the repercussions of violations
of the regulations. Since the regulations are adopted only by private contract
17. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guildelines-Spring Gun or Scarecrow, 8 J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. MKT LAW 381, 383-384 (1986).
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between the corporation and those designated as insiders, only a private contract
right is involved. Under this right, insiders may be dismissed from their jobs or
otherwise punished in relation to their employment situation. The major penalty
is the requirement that the insider forfeit the profits made as a result of the
forbidden transaction to the corporation with whom they have insider contact.
3. Criminal
The regulations provide no criminal penalties.
F. Conclusion
Should the EEC Proposed Directive on Insider Trading be accepted by the
European Council, West Germany can be expected to implement legislation in
conformity with it.
VI. SWITZERLAND
A. Governing Statute
Swiss law does not currently proscribe insider trading. New legislation will
soon be voted on, however, which will impose criminal sanctions for insider
trading violations. A bill was originally submitted to the Swiss Senate in the
Autumn 1986 Session and remains in "revisited draft bill form." On October 7,
1987, the National Counsel approved a law providing for penal sanctions for
insider trading on the Stock Exchange by a vote of 110 to 3. The House of
Commons approved a text which adopts a more severe approach to insider trading
than that adopted by the Counsel of States. The last version, adopted by the
National Counsel, has proven to be a sort of compromise." The legislation is
expected to take effect early in 1988. It will take the form of article 161 of the
Penal Code, "Misuse of Confidential Information," and will contain four
sections.
The Swiss Government has been attentive to problems of international se-
curities regulation. On August 3, 1982, before the Swiss Government considered
enacting insider trading prohibitions, it entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing with the United States Government. This Memorandum established
means by which the two governments could cooperate in the international law
enforcement of insider trading. While Swiss bank secrecy laws are waived in
18. See also Studer, Swiss Ban on Insider Trading Advances in Parliament Vote, Wall St. J., Oct. 8,
1987, at 44, col. 4. For recent developments see generally Krauskopf, Die Neue Insidernorm,
WIRTSCHAFTr UND RECHT, Jg. 38, Heft 2 (1986).
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Switzerland only in cases of Swiss legal violations, the government made a
partial exception for the United States Government in the Memorandum and in a
Private Agreement Among Members of the Swiss Bankers' Association. Section
1, paragraph 4 of the Memorandum states that:
The parties concluded that the conduct of persons who utilize Swiss banks to effect
securities transactions in the United States, in order to take advantage of material
non-public information, is deterimental to the interests of both nations.
The Memorandum and the Private Agreement expanded the degree of coopera-
tion between the two governments with regard to criminal activities which had
been provided for in the 1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
Where the original 1977 Treaty does not assist the United States with regard to
insider trading allegations or where the United States is unable to obtain evidence
through the compulsory process, under section 3, paragraph 1 of the Memoran-
dum, the Agreement permits:
... participating banks to disclose the identity of a customer and certain other
relevant information, under certain specified circumstances, in response to a re-
quest made by the Department of Justice and on behalf of the U.S. SEC and
processed through the Federal Office for Police Matters. It would also contain
certain safeguards regarding protection of customers and the sovereignty of
Switzerland.
If the Swiss Government enacts insider trading legislation this special arrange-
ment will no longer be necessary.
B. Definition of Insiders Under Proposed Legislation
Section 1 of the new legislation defines "insider" as one who serves as a
member of a board of directors, as an officer or auditor (representative) of a
corporation. Attornies and representative agents for private companies, or parents
or subsidiaries of private companies, and those who serve in the capacity of a
public official or their assistant are also included in the definition of insider.
Section 2 states that tippees and third parties will also be held legally responsi-
ble for trading, as described in Section 1, which occurs on the basis of inside
information whether it was obtained directly or indirectly.
C. Regulated Information
Section 1 defines "confidential information" as information which, if dis-
closed, would foreseeably exercise a notable influence on the price of securities
traded on the Stock Exchange or avant bourse (at the Stock Exchange by author-
ized brokers, but not during the opening hours of the market). These securities
include shares, other securities or assimilated "non-securities" bills of the corpo-
ration (effets comptables), and option trading in those securities.
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D. Regulated Transactions
All transactions by which an insider makes an improper profit on the basis of
insider information will be prohibited. Section 2ter clarifies that the facts referred
to in sections 1 and 2 shall include the imminent offering of new participating
certificates, a merger or similar information of equal significance. Section 3 notes
that sections 1 and 2 apply to both corporations involved in a merger considera-
tion. Under section 4, sections 1 through 3 apply by analogy when the misused
confidential information relates to stocks, other securities, "non-securities" bills
or options of a cooperative company or a foreign company.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
No civil penalties are as yet envisioned.
2. Criminal
The new law calls for prison sentences as long as three years and fines of as
much as forty thousand Swiss francs "for those who personally profit from or
help others gain from confidential knowledge that could 'significantly' influence
the price of a stock or other financial instruments. 9
Insiders who posses confidential information and obtain for themselves or a
third party a pecuniary advantage by misusing that information, or communicate
such information to a third party and, by this means, obtain a pecuniary advan-
tage for themselves or for a third party, will be punished by imprisonment or a
fine.
Section 2 states that the third party or tippee to whom such information is
directly or indirectly communicated by a person referred to in section 1, who
misuses this information and thereby obtains a pecuniary advantage for himself
or a third party, will be punished by a one year maximum imprisonment or a fine.
Article 36 of the Swiss Penal Code stipulates that when no maximum penalty
for imprisonment is specified, the offender may be sentenced to a prison term of
up to three years. When no maximum fine is specified, the offender may be
sentenced to a fine of up to 40,000 Swiss francs. The judge may extend the fine
beyond the maximum provided for elsewhere if "cupidity" can be shown.
F. Conclusion
American pleas for mutual aid in preventing insider trading have influenced the
Swiss decision to consider legislation making insider trading a criminal offense
19. Id. at 44, col. 4.
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in Switzerland. Fears have been expressed that the Swiss Government will pass
legislation only to please the United States and that the statute will only serve as
decoration. One Swiss official was cited as stating: "It will have no effect at all on
our trading. The law will legally establish what we already de facto do today."20
The Swiss have not regarded insider trading as especially problematic. In the last
twenty years, approximately ten cases of insider trading were investigated. 2'
VII. BELGIUM
A. Governing Statute
Belgian law currently contains no provision regulating insider trading. How-
ever, during the spring of 1987 the Belgian Government presented a bill to the
Parliament which would modify article 107 of Book I, Title V of the Coordinated
Statutes on Trade (Code de Commerce). The article provides a general framework
to incorporate the European Directive of March 17, 1980 by requiring semestrial
publication of a listed corporation's activities and finances. The Explanatory
Memorandum written by the Government to explain its intentions to the Parlia-
ment states that this modification would provide for temporary suspension of
trading on the market in those securities which are suspected of being subject to
insider trading influence. 2  If passed, the general laws would be expanded and set
forth in a more detailed fashion by royal decree.
Another bill adds two new articles to the penal code: articles 27 and 28
(1986-1987, N. 1). These would permit enforcement of the regulations of article
107 by adopting penal sanctions under article 27, modified by the law of June 30,
1975. This would also implement into Belgian law the three directives concern-
ing securities adopted by the Council of the European Communities. These
include the March 5, 1979 Directive on conditions for admission to an official
listing; the March 17, 1980 Directive concerning the dispersal of information, the
control of the contents of that information, and the circumstances under which
such information must be disclosed; and the February 15, 1982 Directive con-
cerning periodical information to be publicized by corporations listed on the
stock exchange.
Although the Belgian Senate adopted the bill just before the 1987 summer
recess, the House of Representatives has yet to adopt it. Due to the current
political problems in forming a government after the December elections and the
transitionary government's lack of effective legislative power, the chances of the
bill being adopted as law remain uncertain.
20. Bowers & Studer, Stock Move?: Proposed Swiss Ban on Insider Trading May Have Little
Effect, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 24, col. 3.
21. Das Interesse der Banken an der Losung des Insiderproblems, Neue Zircher Zeitung, Feb. 4,
1986, at 19.
22. See Projet de Ioi beige, 533 (1986-1987) N. 1, at 48 (Explanatory Memorandum, Ch. IV).
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B. Definition of Insiders Under Proposed Legislation
The proposed law considers all persons who obtain privileged information by
virtue of their profession or functions to be insiders. 23 Responsibility for im-
proper use of inside information would be imposed upon those independent of the
corporation, but who obtain privileged information concerning other parties by
means of their occupations. Among these are included civil servants, higher staff
of administrations or firms (les cadres), notaries, lawyers, and judges.24
C. Regulated Information
The proposed law defines privileged information as confidential information
which, due to its sufficiently precise and certain character, would influence to a
substantial degree the trading of those securities on the public exchange if it were
rendered public.
D. Regulated Transactions
Insiders are prohibited from:
1. Directly or indirectly obtaining or disposing of securities by exploiting infor-
mation about which they have knowledge in order to realize a profit or avoid a
loss;
2. Advising third persons, on the basis of that information, to sell or buy such
securities in order to allow them to gain a profit or avoid a loss;
3. Or communicating that information to third persons so they will be able to
realize a profit or avoid a loss.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
The current proposed bill contains no civil remedies, although it might be
possible to obtain damages in a negligence suit.25
2. Criminal
Chapter four of article 27, section 1 provides for imprisonment from one
month to one year and/or a fine of between fifty and one thousand francs.
Additionally, if the operations alluded to above took place on the exchange, the
offender may be forced to pay a sum corresponding to all or part of the profit
acquired directly or indirectly or of the loss avoided. This sum can be recovered
as a fine.
23. Id. Ch. IV, Art. 27, 533 (1986-1987) N. 1, at 68.
24. Id. at 533 (1986-1987) N. 2, at 36 (Report of Senator Cooreman, sec. 3.4).
25. Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 8A-49.
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Section 2 gives the Tribunal the authority, like that given the King's prosecutor,
to ask the advice of the Banking Commission of the Exchange Commission
concerned and/or of the particular Stock Commission in all cases of procedure.
These entities shall offer their advice within one month of the request unless the
Tribunal or King's Prosecutor extends the period. The investigatory procedure
will continue in cases where an extension is given.
F. Conclusion
The Banking Commission has condemned insider trading in recent reports as
being contrary to professional ethics. Although many rulings of the Banking
Commission are often referred to as "soft law" because they lack enforcement
capabilities, the business community highly regards the published opinions of the
Commission. A new attitude toward securities regulation has motivated the Com-
mission and the new legislative approach. It emphasizes the necessity for all
investors to be placed on an equal footing and for the public to maintain confi-
dence in the securities exchanges.26
Recently, the Belgian Government decided not to adopt legislation which
would force foreign traders on the Belgian stock exchange to disclose their
identity. The Council of Europe and the European Commission are presently
looking into this issue. For now the Belgian Government will await a unified plan
to be formulated by the European Community before acting on this issue.
VIII. LUXEMBOURG 27
The Luxembourg Government has passed no legislation prohibiting insider
trading. While it has been suggested that the laws against embezzlement could
apply to some severe instances of this activity, there have been no such prosecu-
tions. Instead, Stock Exchange rules regulate trading. Member firms are pre-
vented from executing transaction orders for employees of other firms. The Stock
Exchange Commission may temporarily suspend trading in the securities of a
corporation if it believes that "irregularities" are occurring. Corporations may be
required to open their books for inspection by the Commission. In some in-
stances, the Commission has gone as far as requiring the timely publication of
"material price sensitive information."
In addition, Luxembourg has published the European Code of Conduct in its
official Gazette. The Code specifically condemns insider trading.28 This Code has
been endorsed by the Monetary Institute (Institut Mondtaire) and the Stock
Exchange. No specific cases of insider trading violations have been reported.
26. Projet de loi beige, 533 (1986-1987) N. 2, at 35 (Report of Senator Cooreman, section 3.4).
27. See generally, Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 8B-46.
28. See Eurpean Commission Recommendation of July 25, 1977, 20 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L.
2137) (1977).
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IX. THE NETHERLANDS
A. The Governing Statute
No specific statutory provisions exist in the Netherlands to prohibit or regulate
insider trading. However, the Government does have disclosure requirements
which are partially aimed at controlling and minimizing insider trading relating
to take-over bids.29
In April of 1987 the Committee on Corporation Law, which advises the Minis-
ter of Justice, drafted article 336a, S. 19935 (1986-1987) to regulate insider
trading under the Penal Code. The new Dutch legislation has not yet been voted
on in parliament. The results of the forthcoming vote may be expected in the
latter half of this year.
B. Definition of Insiders
Section 1 defines insiders as those who possess privileged information (voor-
wetenschap or vorwissenschaft), as defined under the statute, which has not been
publicly disclosed. Those insiders who use such information to their advantage in
the Netherlands by acquiring or disposing of securities registered on the Stock
Exchange will violate the article.
C. Regulated Information
Under section 2, insider knowledge is defined as knowledge concerning a
special characteristic of the legal entity or corporation to whom the securities
relate or concerning the trade in those securities:
1. of which the one who is familiar, knows or reasonably should know that they are
not public and that they could not have come outside of a circle of persons with a
duty of confidentiality without violation of a secret; and
2. the publication of which will affect, as one reasonably could expect, the price
fluctuation of the securities.
Section 3 specifies that an individual will not be punished if, only having this
prior knowledge (voorwetenshap) with respect to the trade, he acts in conformity
with the rules of good faith in order to execute an assignment on behalf of another
(in the service of those who requested this transaction).
D. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
No civil penalties are specified.
29. Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 8-27.
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2. Criminal
The Stock Exchange is monitored and "overseen" by the state and, under
section 1, violators will be punished with imprisonment for a maximum of two
years and/or a fine of the fifth category.
X. SWEDEN
A. Governing Statute
The Securities Market Act, SFS 1985:571, entered into force on October 1,
1985. The version of the Act used in this survey includes the amendments to the
Act entering into force on September 1, 1986, SFS 1986:313.
Sections 1 through 3 set forth general goals which include the maintenance of
public confidence in the securities market and the reform of the securities laws to
ensure that individuals' capital investments are not improperly jeopardized. 0
B. Definition of Insiders
Sections 5 and 6 identify the "persons" to be covered under the Act to include
corporations, subsidiaries of corporations, and individuals. Regulated "natural
persons" include directors, managing directors of parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions, leading officers, auditors, and partners in corporate partnerships (exclud-
ing limited partners). It also includes other leading officers or holders of a
"highly qualified assignment of a permanent nature for the company or its parent
enterprise, if the position or assignment may normally be assumed to involve
access to confidential information about circumstances which may affect the
price of shares in the company." Finally, those owning at least five percent of the
share capital or number of votes attaching to all the shares in the corporation are
also included in this definition.
C. Regulated Information
Section 8 of the Act defines confidential information as information which has
not been publicly disclosed, and which, if generally known, would be likely to
affect substantially the price of the company's shares.
D. Regulated Transactions
1. General Provisions
Sections 7 through 16 deal exclusively with the methods used to prevent the
use of confidential company information. Section 7 concerns public offers of
30. Securities Market Act, SFS 1985:571, ISBN 91-7176-107-1, (M. Naylor trans. 1986), at 3.
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acquisition. All who learn confidential information in their capacity as employees
or holders of assignments are prohibited from (on their own or another's account)
purchasing or selling shares of the corporation. They may not advise others to do
so before the offer has been made public or the offer lapsed. This also applies to
other natural persons who hold at least five percent of the shares or capital in the
corporation or have equivalent voting strength.
Section 8 deals with more generalized circumstances. One with an insider
position in a company (not exclusive to the list in section 7) may not buy or sell
any of the company's stocks or advise others to do so when:
a. he knows of information relating to the parent enterprise which isnot yet
publicly known, "if those circumstances are likely to substantially affect the
price of the company's shares when they become generally known;" and
b. "when in other cases he knows of circumstances not made public concerning
the activities of the company or its parent enterprise, if those cirumstances
are manifestly likely to substantially affect the price of the company's shares
when they become generally known."
It is significant that no person will be held liable under this section unless he has
been informed of his insider position as explained in sections 15 and 16.
2. Exemptions
Section 9 provides for exceptions to the prohibitions of sections 7 and 8. Those
holding positions with stockbrokers are excluded from the regulations with re-
gard to the buying or selling "on the stockbroker's account of shares in an OTC
company to which the stockbroker is in a contractual relationship" referred to in
section 4. An OTC company is a "Swedish company limited by shares which has
concluded a contract with a stockbroker under which the latter will on request
quote prices for shares in the company and buy and sell shares in the company at
these prices." This position includes buying and selling of shares and share
options. Those who hold a position with a stockbroker are allowed to execute
orders to purchase or sell as part of their business in other instances. Another
exemption includes purchases of "securities other than share options when the
circumstances are likely to lower the price or sales of securities other than share
options when the circumstances are likely to raise the price." Sales of shares
belonging to natural or juridic (corporate) bankrupt persons are likewise ex-
cluded. Holders of share options may purchase shares to which the options relate
or may sell the options on the day when the options expire. Issuers of share
options may also buy and sell shares to which option relates when the options are
exercised.
3. Notification Requirements
Section 10 provides for written notification to the Securities Register Centre by
those with insider positions of all holdings of shares in the corporation, as well as
any changes in their holdings. Section 11 states that notification shall be required
from those closely related or closely associated to inside persons. These persons
230 SURVEY
include spouses, minors in the person's care, juristic persons over which the
insider exercises "substantial influence" and shares a "substantial common eco-
nomic interest based on a share in ownership or a comparable economic
interest."
Notification is not required in several circumstances:
a. when the person has not been informed of his insider position asunder Sec-
tions 15 or 16;
b. if the holding is less than fifty shares or if it has a market value of less than
ten thousand kronor;
c. if the change in holding after the most recent notification is less than fifty
shares or has market value less than ten thousand kronor;
d. if the holding increase is caused by a bonus issue or stock split;
e. if it is limited to a "provisonal share certificate received in exchange for
another security" which includes rights letters, fractional certificates, provi-
sional share certificates, option warrants, convertible instruments of debt,
instruments of debt carrying an option to subscribe to new shares, and par-
ticipating bonds (covered in section 4).
Section 12 specifies which informational details must be included in a notifica-
tion statement. Section 13 designates time frames during which notification must
be made. Section 14 relates to the duty of the Securities Register Centre to send
out the information supplied to the Bank Inspection Board and the duty of the
Company to retain a copy of the information to be available to all who wish to
inspect it.
Sections 15 and 16 call for corporations to list all persons who will be consid-
ered insiders included in section 6. Section 15 demands that the company list all
employees of and holders of assignments for the company and that it keep the list
for inspection by any person. The company must inform all persons listed of their
insider position and the notification requirements set forth by this statute. Section
16 covers those of parent enterprises whose duties parallel those set forth in
section 15.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Bank Inspection Board
Under section 3, the Bank Inspection Board will supervise compliance with
the provisions of the Act. Sections 17 through 27 govern the operations of the
Bank Inspection Board.
2. Civil
In addition to criminal penalties, which serve as the primary means of deter-
rence, section 31 stipulates that gains from an offense (covered by section 28)
will be declared forfeit as long as it is not unreasonable to do so. Section 32 gives
the right of public prosecution to citizens only by the consent of the Bank
Inspection Board.
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3. Criminal
Section 28 deals with penal sanctions for violators of the requirements set forth
under sections 7 and 8. Penalties range from fines to imprisonment. No penalty
will be assessed if the case does not affect public confidence in the securities
market or if the violation is trivial for other reasons. No penalty is imposed in the
"case of instigation or of complicity in an offense referred to in this section.
Section 29 states that those who wilfully or negligently fail to submit notifica-
tion under section 10 within the stipulated time, will be subjected to a maximum
six month imprisonment or a fine. The same penalty will be imposed if one
provides incorrect or misleading information in the notification or fails to observe
the requirement in section 14 that he keep a copy of the notification accessible to
any person wishing to inspect it. Penalties will be imposed here, as above, only
in non-trivial cases.
XI. AUSTRALIA 31
A. Governing Statute
The Australian government has legislated detailed insider trading regulations.
Applicable statutes are contained in Part X of the National Securities Industry
Code, and are supplemented by provisions in the National Companies Code and
the National Companies and Securities Act.
B. Definition of Insiders
Section 128(1) of the National Securities Industry Code prohibits trading in
securities of a corporation if one is "connected with the corporation and, by
virtue of that connection, is in possession of materially price sensitive informa-
tion that is not generally available."
1. Natural Persons
Those connected with the corporation at any time in a six month period before
a contemplated transaction are subject to a prohibition of trading in that com-
pany's securities. Section 128 appears to apply only to natural persons and not to
corporations.
Under section 128(8) one is "connected with a corporation" if he:
a. is an officer of that corporation or of a related corporation;
b. is a substantial shareholder under the National Companies Code (has an
interest, beneficial or otherwise, in ten percent or more of the voting shares of
a listed public corporation; or
31. See generally, Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 10-50 to 10-59; see also Herne, Inside Informa-
tion: Definitions in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT LAW
1-19 (1986).
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c. occupies a position that can reasonably be expected to give him access to
price sensitive information, by virtue either of any professional or business
relationship between himself and the corporation, or of his being an officer of
another corporation of which is a substantial shareholder.
This language implies that outside consultants such as lawyers, accountants, and
underwriters could be connected with a corporation so as to incur liability for
insider trading. Under section 128(9), however, licensed dealers possessing price
sensitive information may buy or sell securities as an agent for a client as long as
he acts on specific instructions from the client and has not given any advice to the
client concerning trading in those securities.
2. Corporations as Insiders
Although corporations are not considered capable of being "connected with
another corporation" under section 128, corporations are prohibited from trading
in securities of another corporation whenever any of the corporation's officers are
prohibited from dealing in them. Certain exceptions to this rule are available:
a. if a decision to make transaction in the corporation's name is made by some-
one other than a director or officer, and that person does not know of the price
sensitive information; and
b. if a valid "Chinese Wall" is erected by which the corporation ensures that
confidential information will not be communicated to those trading in se-
curities, and by which no insider with the price sensitive information gives
trading advice to that person.
3. Tippees
Section 128(3) applies to "tippees." A tippee with price sensitive information
may not deal in the securities of a company if:
a. he "has obtained that information, directly or indirectly, from a person whom
he knows or ought reasonably to have known is precluded from dealing in
those securities under Sections 128(1) and 128(2)"; and
b. the tippee associated himself with the insider when the transaction was made,
or made arrangements to communicate confidential information.
C. Regulated Information
Insider information includes materially price sensitive information that is not
generally available. More specifically, section 48(1) of the National Companies
and Securities Commission Act prohibits any person administering cooperative
scheme legislation from dealing in securities while in possession of price sen-
sitive information acquired by reason of their connection with the administration
of the scheme.
INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION SURVEY 233
D. Regulated Transactions
Section 128(2) forbids trading in another corporation's securities if the confi-
dential information relates to any actual or expected transaction involving that
corporation and the corporation with which the insider is connected. That section
targets insider trading which occurs prior to the announcement of a take-over or
tender offer.
People who are precluded from dealing under sections 128(1) (2) or (3) are
prohibited from soliciting any other person to deal in those securities. Section
128(5) states that such persons must not communicate price sensitive information
to any other person if the securities are listed on a stock exchange and they know
or ought reasonably to know that the tippee will directly or indirectly use that
information to deal in those securities.
Section 229(3) of the National Companies Code prohibits officers or employ-
ees of corporations from improperly using information acquired by virtue of their
position to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for themselves or any other
person, or to injure the corporation. The term "officer" includes receivers and
liquidators as well as directors, secretaries, and executive officers of the corpora-
tion. "Improper use" of information is not "authoritatively" defined. If one is
considered to be in breach of a legal duty, one's actions will be held to be
improper, although no provision in this Code specifically prohibits insider trad-
ing. The National Securities Industry Code, however, indicates that insider trad-
ing is an offense-so presumably insider trading would also be held to be
"improper" for the purposes of section 229(3) of the National Companies Code.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Civil
Section 130(1) of the National Securities Industry Code provides civil remedies
against persons or companies which commit any offense under section 128,
excluding those in section 128(5). Regulations impose a duty to compensate on
individuals who violate sections 128(1), 128(2), 128(3), or 128(4) and on corpora-
tions which violate section 128(6). Violators will be held liable to reimburse any
other party to the transaction who did not possess the price sensitive information
for any loss incurred as a result. The difference between the price paid and that
price at which the securities would be likely to have been traded had the informa-
tion been generally known at the time serves as the measure of damages. Offen-
ders must also return any profit made from dealing in those securities to the
corporation which issued the securities involved.
The National Companies and Securities Commission can bring an action on
behalf of a person or corporation to recover loss or profit from the insider if the
Commission believes it to be in the public interest to do so. A violation under
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section 48 will result in liability to compensate the other party to the transaction
*for any loss caused by the deal, A two year statute of limitations applies to a civil
action under section 48 and under section 128.
Section 130(3) places a ceiling on the amount of compensation for which an
insider or tippee will be held responsible. The maximum amount owed will be
limited to the loss sustained by the other party to the transaction or the profit
owed the corporation. Alternatively the court can subtract from the profit or loss
the total of the amount that a court found the person to be liable to pay to any
other person under. either Part X of the National Securities Industry Code or
section 229 of the National Companies Code by reason of the same act of
transaction.
2. Criminal
Section 126 of the National Securities Industry Code sets forth criminal penal-
ties. If a corporation is involved, it will be subjected to a fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars. In cases of violations involving natural persons, a fine not
exceeding twenty thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for a period of up to five
years will be imposed. Section 128(10) allows for a defense that the other party to
the particular transaction knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the price
sensitive information before entering into the transaction.
Section 48(1) of the National Companies and Securities Commission Act
outlines penalties for insider trading by persons administering the cooperative
scheme legislation. These include a twenty thousand dollar fine or up to five
years imprisonment. The defense available under section 128 is unavailable under
section 48.
The National Companies Code section 229(4) provides for punishments sim-
ilar to those in section 48 of the National Companies and Securities Commission
Act. An officer or employee violating section 229(3) will be subjected to a
twenty thousand dollar fine, a maximum five years imprisonment, or both. Insid-
ers will also be forced to disgorge any profits made or to compensate the corpora-
tion for any damages suffered as result of breach. A court which convicts under
section 229(3) may award damages. Civil actions by the corporation are to be
recovered in a separate action instituted by the corporation.
XII. CANADA 32
A. Governing Statute
Seven of ten Canadian provinces regulate insider trading in conjunction with
the Canada Business Corporation Act sections 121 through 125 under which
32. See generally UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1987)
at 111-139 to 111-158; 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES, 1-94 to 1-96, 4-54 to
4-56, 4-77 to 4-81 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1987); see also Herne, supra note 31.
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federal corporations may be incorporated. Since the provinces have their own
stock exchanges, the different provinces' leglislation schemes apply to different
securities and varied transactions. Considerable overlap in insider trading regula-
tion results and the same corporation may be subject to sanctions under several
different provinces.
Ontario represents one of the principal capital markets in Canada. This
province maintains statutes which extensively regulate insider trading in the
Ontario Securities Act (OSA).
B. Definition of Insiders
Ontario legislation defines insiders as those who stand in a "special rela-
tionship" with a reporting issuer. Those "in a special relationship" to the
reporting issuer are defined under OSA section 131(7) as those who are:
1. insiders or affiliates of the reporting issuer;
2. directors, officers, or employees of the reporting issuer or of acompany that is
an insider or affiliate of the reporting issuer;
3. persons or corporations who, by virtue of their past, current, or proposed
business or professional activities with or on behalf of the reporting issuer, have
acquired knowledge of the material fact or material change; and
4. associaties of the reporting issuer or of any of those just listed.
C. Regulated Information
The Ontario statute regulates information which concerns the selling of se-
curities in a corporation with the knowledge of a material fact or material change
with respect to the reporting issuer that has not generally been disclosed.
OSA section 1(1)22 defines a "material fact" as one which "significantly
affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect, on the
market price or value" of the securities.
OSA section 1(1)21 specifies that "material change" is "one in business,
operations, or capital of the reporting issuer that would reasonably be expected to
have a significant effect on market price or value of the securities, and includes a
decision to implement such a change by the board of directors or by senior
management who believe that confirmation of the decision by the board of
directors is probable."
D. Regulated Transactions
Liability attaches under OSA section 131(1) in two main instances:
1. when insiders buy or sell based on confidential information; and
2. if insiders directly or indirectly communicate knowledge of amaterial fact or
material change to a person who or company which thereafter sells securities of
the reporting issuer.
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E. Punishment and Sanctions
Three different means of enforcement are available to provincial adminstrators:
administrative and civil sanctions, violations of provincial securities legislation,
and breaches of the federal Criminal Code.
1. Administrative Sanctions
Provincial authorities may revoke licenses or registration of those registered on
the securities exchanges after a hearing. Other tactics taken include the denial of
exemptions for detailed registration and prospectus and take-over bid require-
ments. Under OSA section 69(1) the Commission may suspend trading in a
corporation's securities if circumstances are discovered after acceptance of the
prospectus which would justify its refusal. This would embrace situations where
misleading or false information was contained in the prostectus or where material
information was unjustifiably witheld from public knowledge. Although it is an
unusual remedy, the Commission may apply to a court for an order commanding
compliance with the sections under the Ontario Securities Act.
2. Civil
Persons who communicate inside information to third parties who in turn trade
in those securities are liable to compensate the purchaser or seller of those
securities for the loss incurred. Damages must be paid under OSA section 131(2)
for those who themselves trade on inside information.
Defenses are allowed under OSA section 131(l)(a), (b), (c) and 131(2)(a), (b),
(c). One will not be held liable for a tranaction based on inside information if one
had reasonable grounds to believe that the other party to the transaction knew the
information. An insider may also avoid liability by proving that he did not use the
confidential information in effecting the transaction or in communicating knowl-
edge of the information to others who purchased or sold the securities in
question.
If more than one defendant is involved, the liability will be joint and several
under OSA section 131(5). OSA section 131(6) provides that the statutory meas-
ure of damages is the difference between the price paid or received in the
transaction and the average market price of the security in the twenty trading days
following general disclosure of the material fact or material change. The provi-
sion also allows for a court to consider other measures of damages as may be
relevant in the particular circumstances. Under OSA section 131(4) defendants
who are insiders, associates, or affiliates of the reporting issuer will be held
accountable to the reporting issuer for any benefit or advantage received or
receivable as a result of the purchase or sale of the securities, or communication
of the material fact or material change, as the case may be. The defenses spec-
ified above apply to violations under this section.
OSA section 132 permits security holders, the reporting issuer, or the Commis-
sion to apply to the courts for an order requiring the Commission or authorizing
INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION SURVEY 237
the security holders to commence or continue an action in the name of the
reporting issuer to enforce the insider trading liability. OSA section 135 stipulates
that an action to enforce liability provisions must be commenced within the
earlier of 180 days after the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts giving rise to
the cause of action or three years after the date of the transaction.
OSA section 112 permits shareholders to request the courts to commence an
action under the insider trading regulations. Companies' legislation schemes
often make provision for derivative actions to be undertaken on behalf of the
corporation and its shareholders. This is provided for under the Ontario Business
Corporation Act section 97 and the Canada Business Corporation Act, section
232.
3. Criminal
Federal criminal sanctions relate to general offenses such as fraud and false
pretenses. The Code specifically prohibits offenses relating to securities only in a
few instances. Two examples include: knowingly making or publishing a false
prospectus and fraudulently manipulating a stock exchange transaction.
XIII. JAPAN 33
A. Governing Statute
Japan regulates insider trading through the Securities Exchange Law of 1948,
as amended in June of 1985 (SEL). The Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Rules,
etc. of Soundness of Securities Companies recently modified this law.34
The government will soon enact new legislation, which will emphasize the
enforcement of insider trading violations. A special task force of the Securities
and Exchange Council of the finance Ministry issued a report in February of 1988
which recommends clearer definitions of "insiders" and "inside information," as
well as stiffer civil and criminal sanctions for violations.3 5
B. Definition of Insiders
Members of the securities industry, such as brokers and underwriters, are
considered "insiders" within the meaning of the applicable statutes. Officers and
employees of corporations are considered to be insiders as well. According to
33. See generally Kanzaki, Developments in Insider Trading in Japan, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 391-394 (1982); Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 11-42 to 11-43; Ministry of Finance
Ordinance No. 60, Nov. 5, 1965 (as amended Sept. 20, 1985).
34. Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 60, Nov. 5, 1965 (as amended Sept. 20, 1985).
35. Graven, Japan's Efforts to Fight Insider Trading Must Overcome Acceptance of Practice, Wall
St. J., Feb. 24, 1988, at 26, col 3.
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1971 guidelines provided to the Securities Dealers Association by the Securities
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, corporate insiders include directors, key
employees, or major shareholders of an issuing company.
The 1988 report proposes that investors be divided into three categories relat-
ing to their degree of access to information:
1. "insiders" including company employees and substantial shareholders;
2. "semi-insiders" such as stockbrokers, accountants, lawyers, government offi-
cials and other employees who, by contract, have access to inside information;
and
3. "general recipients" which include journalists or spouses and relatives of other
insiders. 36
C. Regulated Information
Those employed in the securities industry are specifically prohibited from
trading securities on non-public, material information by the SEL and the rules of
the self-regulatory body. Officers and employees of a corporation are prohibited
by the SEL and the rules of the Ministry of Finance from trading for their
personal benefit on "special information-such as purchase or sale orders from
customers-obtained by virtue of their position."
The 1988 report of the special task force defines inside information as "any
unannounced information that may affect share price movements." Examples of
inside information as defined in the report include information concerning merg-
ers, new stock offerings, new product and technology developments. 7
D. Regulated Transactions
Japan's regulations are modeled after United States legislation.
Article 50 covers generally prohibited activities. It applies to officers and
employees and prohibits them from:
1. soliciting buying, selling, or other transactions of securities through offered
opinions containing predictions concerning price fluctuations;
2. soliciting buying, selling, or other transactions of securities by undertaking a
customer to absorb the loss incurred as a result of a transaction involving such
securities;
3. undertaking any of the activities outlined in the Ministerial Ordinance Concern-
ing Rules, etc. of Soundness of Securities Companies.
These include:
a. making misrepresentations or misleading misrepresentations of a material
fact with respect to a sale or purchase or other transaction in securities;
b. soliciting customers to buy or sell securities by offering special benefits;
c. series of acts of buying or selling with the intent to create a false market, or
acts to entrust such actions to others knowing that a false market will result;
36. Id. at 26, col. 3.
37. Id. at 26, col. 3.
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d. deceptive dealing on margins accounts; e. buying and selling securities by an
officer or employee of a company based on information obtained in the
performance of his duties for the sole purpose of pursuing "speculative
interests."
Japanese law contains an anti-fraud provision, SEL Art. 58, modeled on the
United States Rule lOb-5. It prohibits the use of fraudulent devices with respect
to buying, selling, or other securities transactions; the obtaining of money or
property by using documents or representations containing untrue statements of a
material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements not misleading; and the use of false quotations for purpose of solicit-
ing buying, selling or other transactions of securities.
SEL article 189, paragraph 1, serves as a 16(b) type of provision which re-
quires corporate insiders to disgorge short-swing profits. Unfortunately it has
failed to operate effectively since the repeal in 1953 of their version of the
American 16(a) provision. This article, like the United States counterpart, ap-
plies to officers or shareholders who own more than ten percent of the corpora-
tion's total number of issued shares.
E. Punishment and Sanctions
1. Preventative Measures
The administrative agency and self-regulating bodies try to educate busi-
nessmen about insider trading and prevent them from engaging in such activities.
These bodies have provided guidelines by which securities companies investigate
purchase and sale orders from corporate insiders before they are executed. Com-
panies should refuse to close suspicious transactions and report any indications of
insider trading to the stock exchange.
Examiners from the Ministry of Finance or the stock exchanges annually
appraise compliance with the guidelines. Warnings are issued for those who fail
to fulfill duties imposed by the law. The market surveillance department of each
stock exchange monitors transactions on the exchanges and investigates unusual
market action. Once the stock exchange receives reports of insider trading, it may
prevent such transactions by temporarily suspending trade in a particular issue of
securities. Although the suspension mechanism has been employed quite often,38
the Japanese generally do not enforce most of the insider trading legislation, and
rely for the most part on moral and social sanctions to prevent such activities.
2. Civil
In order for a victim to recover for a violation under the general anti-fraud
provision, he must resort to article 709 of the Civil Code, the general tort
38. The Tokyo Stock Exchange suspended trading in particular securities issues twenty-four times
in 1979, fourteen times in 1980, and sixteen times in 1981. Kanzaki, supra note 33, at 393.
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provision, to recover damages. As of 1982, no court decisions had appeared
under the statute for a ten year period.
3. Criminal
The Japanese government plans to legislate penal sanctions on insider trading.
The special task force of the SEC of the Finance Ministry proposed that criminal
sanctions be adopted in forthcoming legislation. 39
F. Conclusion
International pressures from the major economic powers have forced Japan
either to conform its securities regulation to that employed in other countries or
risk losing a major portion of its foreign market as a result of decreased confi-
dence in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The Government will either amend the
Securities Exchange Law of 1948 or will promulgate a special statute. There is a
good chance that the bill will be presented to the Diet this coming year. With new
legislation on the drafting table, it is likely that Japan will begin to enforce
sanctions against insider trading.
XIV. HONG KONG 40
A. Governing Statute
Recent problems with the stability of the stock exchange has prompted the
Government of Hong Kong to consider new legislation concerning insider trad-
ing. Stricter regulation of insider trading could be expected in the next year.
Although the laws are likely change in the near future, the information provided
in this section offers an indication of the lenient attitudes prevalent in Hong Kong
with regard to insider trading.
No formal statutory controls existed in Hong Kong until 1978. In that year the
Government reacted to a major "scandal involving two directors of a company,
the "Wheelock Marden Affair", by amending the defunct Securities (Amend-
ment) Ordinance of 1978 and created Part XIIA of the Ordinance on Insider
Dealing. They rejected solutions involving criminal or civil penalties and em-
ployed means by which insider trading would "attract the risk of public ex-
posure" through a committee known as the "Insider Dealing Tribunal."
B. Definition of Insiders
Section 141E regulates those connected with a corporation. Those "connected"
include directors, officers, employees or "substantial shareholders" of the corpo-
39. Graven, supra note 35, at 26, col. 3.
40. See generally, Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 12-120 to 12-128.
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ration whose securities are involved. "Connected individuals" include those
who, by means of their business or professional position, may reasonably be
expected to have access to relevant information regarding a corporation's se-
curities are also prohibited from dealing in those securities. This includes em-
ployees of subsidiary and parent corporations, as well as those privy to
information concerning tender-offers and take-overs. One will also be considered
to be "connected" with a corporation if one has had dealings with a corporation
in any of the above manners in the six months prior to the transaction in question.
"Substantial shareholders" include holders of equity share capital of a nominal
value exceeding ten percent of that share capital or holders of over ten percent of
the voting power at any general meeting.
C. Regulated Information
Under section 141D(1-2), "relevant information" must concern securities and
must be information which "is not generally available but, if it were, would be
likely to cause a material price change in those securities."
D. Regulated Transactions
Under section 141 B, insider trading in a corporation's securities will be con-
sidered "culpable" when the transaction is "made, procured or 'occasioned' by
one connected with that corporation who possesses "relevant information" with
regard to those securities. One who "tips" or discloses relevant information
concerning those securities to a third party or "tippee" will also be held responsi-
ble if the tipper "knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that the tippee
will use that information to deal, or procure another to deal, in those securities."
The tippee must actually use the information as a basis for an ensuing transaction
in order for the tipper to be considered culpable.
Section 141 of the Ordinance specifies that some types of insider trading are not
"culpable." Those securities which are not listed on an approved stock exchange
will not be subjected to the requirements under the regulation. Bona fide transac-
tions executing underwriting agreements or obligations of personal represen-
tativess, liquidators, receivers, or trustees in bankruptcy are also excluded.
Certain considerations exclude individuals from culpability even though sanc-
tions would otherwise apply. If a "Chinese Wall" effectively insulates those with
relevant knowledge from those who execute transactions in the securities, then
the individual who traded on good faith will not fall under the regulation. One
will not be held accountable for trading if one's purpose for trading was not to
earn a profit or avoid a loss by using the relevant information. Finally, one who
merely executes a transaction on an order from another, without having advised
that person or communicated any relevant information to him, will not be sanc-
tioned by the Tribunal.
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E. Punishments and Sanctions
The Insider Dealing Tribunal decides whether or not to hold an individual
culpable. Section 141G and paragraphs 2-11 of the Third Schedule set forth the
Tribunal's structure and membership. Formal inquiries are initiated under section
141H(1-2) by the Financial Secretary, either on his own initiative or on recom-
mendation by another (including private individuals). Once investigation has
begun, the Tribunal conducts an inquiry under section 1411(1) and prepares a
written report. The Tribunal may subpoena and examine witnesses and docu-
ments and issue arrest warrants for those who fail to comply with its orders, and
may also issue warrants for search and seizure of pertinent material. The Tribunal
retains extensive powers under both the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance and
the Securities Ordinance. The Commissioner also possesses broad powers to
review corporations' books and records. Those who fail to cooperate with his
orders may be liable on conviction to a five thousand dollar fine and three
months' imprisonment. The same punishments apply to other offenses, such as
providing misleading or false information. Privilege does not excuse anyone from
cooperating with the Commissioner. Except for disclosing clients' names and
addresses, legal advisers are not required to disclose verbal or written priviledged
communications made to or by them. After inquiries and conclusions are made,
the Tribunal publishes a report, either finding culpability or innocence. "Ideally,
those charged with insider dealing would have been either publicly exonerated, or
found culpable, in which case they would have suffered the indignity of public
exposure of their conduct.""
F. Conclusion
Only one case, the Hutchison Whampoa Limited Case, had been conducted as
of 1985 under the Insider Dealing provisions. The Tribunal published the report
finding culpability in that case nearly two and one-half years after the "culpable"
trading occurred. This inquiry led to criticism of the process and suggested
amendments, some of which may soon be enacted into law. One of the reforms
suggested is a more specific definition of "culpable insider dealing": "The con-
scious use for the purpose of profit or of avoidance of loss of confidential price-
sensitive information to buy or sell shares to which that information relates or the
disclosure of confidential price-sensitive information to a person likely to use the
information for that purpose." 42 Reforms were also suggested which would
eliminate many of the formal procedural requirements, in order that the report
may be published in a more timely fashion for greater impact.
41. Id. at 12-128.
42. Id. at 12-131.
